Hanafi Views on Prophethood after the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) | A Refutation

Introduction

Anti-Ahmadis often quote statements from earlier Hanafi scholars declaring that anyone who claims prophethood after the Holy Prophet Muhammad ﷺ is a disbeliever. The implication is that these statements automatically refute the Ahmadi claim of the Promised Messiah. However, this argument depends upon an important assumption: that these scholars were condemning the exact conception of prophethood that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed. That assumption cannot simply be taken for granted; it has to be demonstrated.

The question is therefore not whether Hanafi scholars condemned the idea of an independent prophet arising after Muhammad ﷺ. Clearly, they did. The real question is whether their statements were intended to condemn the very specific conception of Zillī or Burūzī prophethood claimed by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad: a completely subordinate status, derived from and dependent upon the prophethood of Muhammad ﷺ, without a new Sharīʿah and without independent prophetic authority.

That distinction is essential.

A Convenient Way of Avoiding the Broader Hanafi Tradition

There is a convenient way in which this argument is sometimes constructed. Rather than engaging with the broader Hanafi intellectual tradition concerning nubuwwah, wilayah, zill, buruz, and the relationship between prophethood and spiritual inheritance, anti-Ahmadi writers go back to isolated Arabic juridical statements from earlier Hanafi authorities and present them as though they settle the entire question.

This conveniently allows them to avoid engaging with the broader Hanafi-Sufi tradition, including later Deobandi and Barelwi scholars as well as major figures who preceded those movements.

More importantly, it allows them to avoid dealing with figures such as Ibn ʿArabi and Mujaddid Alf Thani, whose writings contain discussions highly relevant to the distinction between law-bearing prophethood and subordinate spiritual inheritance.

The point is not that Ibn ʿArabi, Mujaddid Alf Thani, the Deobandis, or the Barelwis were simply “Ahmadi.” They obviously were not. The point is that the Hanafi-Sufi intellectual tradition contains a much more complicated discussion of prophethood, sainthood, spiritual inheritance, and Khatam an-Nabiyyin than the anti-Ahmadi presentation suggests.

For example, Mujaddid Alf Thani is quoted as saying that following the advent of Muhammad ﷺ, the attainment of the attributes of prophethood by his followers “as subordinate or by way of inheritance” does not conflict with his status as the Seal of the Prophets.

Likewise, Ibn ʿArabi distinguishes between the termination of law-bearing prophethood and the broader station of prophethood. He explicitly discusses the end of nubuwwah al-tashrīʿ while explaining that this does not necessarily mean that every dimension associated with the prophetic station has simply ceased to exist.

This is also why the statement of Mawlana Sajid Khan Naqshbandi is relevant. He did not merely acknowledge that Ibn ʿArabi’s passages are difficult or that they require discussion. In addressing one of the difficult passages in Futuhat al-Makkiyyah concerning the continuation of nubuwwah, he explicitly acknowledged the problem by saying, in substance, “we Hanafis have no answer” to it.

That is significant. A prominent Deobandi Hanafi debater is not simply being confronted with an Ahmadi interpretation of Ibn ʿArabi; he himself acknowledges that there is a passage within the writings of a major Hanafi-Sufi authority for which, by his own admission, “we Hanafis have no answer.”

This demonstrates that the matter is not as simple as quoting a few early Hanafi juridical statements and declaring the entire question settled.

The issue is more complicated than that.

The Hanafi Quotations that are brought against us

Let us therefore look at the quotations that are being presented.

Abu Hafs al-Kabir is quoted as saying:

“Likewise, if [someone] were to say, ‘I am the Messenger of Allah,’ or said in Persian, ‘I am a prophet,’ intending by it that he delivers a message, he has disbelieved…”

Jamal ud-Din al-Ghaznawi states:

“Whoever claims prophethood is obligated to repent. If he does not repent, it is obligatory to execute him.”

Ibn Nujaym writes:

“If he isn’t aware that Muhammad ﷺ is the last of the prophets, then he is not a Muslim because [this is known] by necessity.”

Mulla ʿAli al-Qari states:

“The claim of prophethood after our Prophet ﷺ is disbelief by consensus.”

Al-Tahawi likewise writes that Muhammad ﷺ is:

“the Seal of the Prophets…”

and:

“Every claim to prophethood after him is falsehood and deceit.”

These quotations certainly establish that these Hanafi authorities rejected a claim to prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ. There is no need to dispute that point.

The question is what kind of claim were they rejecting?

Were they rejecting the idea that an independent prophet, possessing his own prophetic authority, could arise after Muhammad ﷺ?

Were they rejecting a prophet who brought a new Sharīʿah?

Were they rejecting someone who denied that Muhammad ﷺ was Khatam an-Nabiyyīn?

Or were they also specifically rejecting the concept of a prophet whose entire status is subordinate to, dependent upon, and a manifestation of the prophethood of Muhammad ﷺ?

The anti-Ahmadi argument must establish this rather than simply assuming it.

But Look at What Mulla ʿAli al-Qari Himself Says

An anti-Ahmadi may try to shut down this distinction by pointing to the strongest-sounding wording in these quotations.

They may say:

“Look, al-Tahawi says, ‘Every claim to prophethood after him is falsehood and deceit,’ and Mulla ʿAli al-Qari says, ‘The claim of prophethood after our Prophet ﷺ is disbelief by consensus.’ What more needs to be explained?”

But there is a serious problem with this argument.

The very same Mulla ʿAli al-Qari who is quoted against Ahmadis also gives a qualification concerning Khatam an-Nabiyyin that is directly relevant to this discussion.

In Al-Asrar al-Marfuʿah fi al-Akhbar al-Mawduʿah, he writes:

ومع هذا لو عاش إبراهيم وصار نبيا، وكذا لو صار عمر نبيا لكانا من أتباعه عليه الصلاة والسلام كعيسى والخضر وإلياس عليهم السلام. فلا يناقض قولَه تعالى: (وخاتم النبيين) إذ المعنى أنه لا يأتي نبي بعده ينسخ ملته ولم يكن من أمته

Had Ibrahim lived and become a prophet, and likewise had Umar become a prophet they would be follower prophets of the Holy Prophet , peace and blesings of Allah be upon him, like Isa, Khidar and Ilyas upon whom all be peace. It does not contradict the divine word ‘Khataman Nabiyyeen’ which means that there shall not be a prophet abrogating his law nor one who was not of his Ummah.[Al-Asrar Al-Marfu’a Fil-Akhbar Al-Mawdu’a, pg. 183]

He gives the hypothetical examples of Ibrahim and ʿUmar becoming prophets and says that, had they become prophets, they would have been followers of Muhammad ﷺ, like ʿIsa, Khidr, and Ilyas. He explicitly says that this would not contradict Khatam an-Nabiyyin because the meaning is that no prophet would come after Muhammad ﷺ who abrogated his religion and was not from his Ummah.

This is extremely significant.

The anti-Ahmadi writer cannot simply quote al-Qari’s statement that “the claim of prophethood after our Prophet ﷺ is disbelief by consensus” and then pretend that al-Qari’s understanding of Khatam an-Nabiyyin contains no qualifications whatsoever.

Al-Qari himself discusses a hypothetical prophet after Muhammad ﷺ who would remain a follower of Muhammad ﷺ and explains Khatam an-Nabiyyin in terms of there being no prophet who would abrogate Muhammad’s law or be outside his Ummah.

Therefore, the discussion is clearly more nuanced than:

“Anyone ever described as a prophet after Muhammad ﷺ = kufr.”

The question is what type of prophethood is being excluded?

And if an anti-Ahmadi responds, “But al-Qari still says that claiming prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ is kufr,” then the answer is simple:

Fine. Explain how that statement is to be reconciled with al-Qari’s own qualification of Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

More importantly, demonstrate that his statement encompasses the specific Ahmadi conception of Zillī/Burūzī prophethood.

That is the actual argument that needs to be made.

The Descent of Jesus ﷺ Creates the Same Problem

There is an even more important issue.

The Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah historically objected to the descent of Jesus ﷺ because they believed that his return would conflict with the finality of prophethood. Sunni scholars such as Qadi ʿIyad and Imam al-Nawawi responded to this objection by explaining that Jesus ﷺ does not descend with a law that abrogates the Sharīʿah of Muhammad ﷺ. Rather, he descends as a just judge ruling according to the Sharīʿah of Muhammad ﷺ.

Notice what has happened here.

A Sunni authority is directly confronting the apparent contradiction between:

Khatam an-Nabiyyin

and:

the return of a man who is already a prophet.

The solution is not simply to say:

“Jesus will cease to be a prophet.”

Rather, the solution is to distinguish between independent, law-bearing prophethood and the status of Jesus ﷺ as a prophet who returns while remaining subject to the Sharīʿah of Muhammad ﷺ.

That distinction is fundamental.

Many Sunnis use precisely this distinction to defend the traditional belief in the descent of Jesus ﷺ. They say that Jesus ﷺ does not return as an independent prophet bringing a new Sharīʿah. He returns as a follower of Muhammad ﷺ and rules according to the Sharīʿah of Muhammad ﷺ.

But then an obvious question arises:

When Jesus ﷺ descends, will he still be a prophet?

Will he cease to be a prophet before descending?

Will Allah strip him of his prophethood?

Will the Qur’an and Sunnah suddenly stop describing him as a prophet?

Or will he remain the very same Jesus ﷺ who was already a prophet before the advent of Muhammad ﷺ?

If Jesus ﷺ remains a prophet, then the mere proposition that someone after Muhammad ﷺ can truthfully be called a prophet cannot, by itself, be the complete definition of what constitutes a violation of Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

There must be a distinction concerning what kind of prophethood is meant.

And this is precisely where the anti-Ahmadi argument becomes inconsistent.

When the discussion concerns Jesus ﷺ, the distinction is accepted:

“Yes, Jesus is a prophet, but he is not an independent, law-bearing prophet after Muhammad ﷺ.”

But when the discussion concerns Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the same distinction is suddenly declared meaningless.

Why?

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Own Explanation

This is where Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s own writings become decisive, because we should not allow an opponent to define his claim for him.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad explicitly addressed the accusation that he was claiming the type of prophethood his opponents associated with a post-Muhammadan claimant.

He wrote:

“The aim of this discourse is that while my ignorant opponents accuse me of claiming to be a Prophet or Messenger, I myself make no such claim. I am neither a Prophet nor a Messenger as they think. But I am a Prophet and a Messenger in the way that I have just explained.”

This sentence is crucial.

He does not simply say:

“I am a prophet after Muhammad ﷺ.”

He explicitly says:

“I am neither a Prophet nor a Messenger as they think.”

He then explains the particular sense in which he accepts those terms.

He further states:

“It is only by way of Buruz that I have been made a Prophet and a Messenger…”

And he explains the relationship to Muhammad ﷺ even more explicitly:

“Prophethood and Messengership have not been transferred to anyone else. What belonged to Muhammad ﷺ remains with Muhammad ﷺ.”

This is precisely the distinction that the anti-Ahmadi argument needs to address.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was not claiming to be an independent prophet possessing a separate prophetic authority. He was not claiming a new Sharīʿah. He was not claiming to be outside the Ummah of Muhammad ﷺ.

His claim was that through Burūz, a person could become a manifestation and reflection of the prophetic reality of Muhammad ﷺ while remaining completely subordinate to him.

Whether one accepts that theological claim is a separate question.

But one cannot refute it merely by proving that Hanafi scholars condemned an independent claim to prophethood unless one first demonstrates that they intended their statements to include this particular subordinate conception.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Explicitly Affirms Khatam an-Nabiyyin

Nor can it reasonably be argued that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad simply rejected the finality of prophethood.

In Eik Ghalati Ka Izala, he explicitly rejects the idea of an independent “new” prophet appearing after Muhammad ﷺ. He also rejects the traditional conception of Jesus ﷺ returning as an old prophet who would continue receiving prophetic revelation for forty years after Muhammad ﷺ.

He explicitly affirms the verse:

Khatam an-Nabiyyin

and the hadith:

La nabi ba’di.

He states in substance that no new or old prophet can come after Muhammad ﷺ in the manner imagined by those who believe that Jesus ﷺ will descend as a prophet and continue receiving prophetic revelation for forty years. He calls such a belief false and says that the verse Khatam an-Nabiyyin and the hadith La nabi ba’di testify against it.

This is important because it shows that his argument was not:

“The Qur’an says Muhammad ﷺ is Khatam an-Nabiyyin, but I reject that.”

His argument was precisely the opposite.

He affirmed Khatam an-Nabiyyin and La nabi ba’di while explaining that his own prophetic terminology referred to a subordinate Burūzī manifestation of the Muhammadi prophethood.

That is the actual theological disagreement.

The Difference Between a New Prophet and a Subordinate Prophet

The distinction can therefore be stated very simply.

There are two fundamentally different propositions:

1. A prophet comes after Muhammad ﷺ possessing an independent prophetic office, with authority separate from Muhammad ﷺ and potentially a new or competing Sharīʿah.

2. A person arises from within the Ummah of Muhammad ﷺ whose prophetic status is completely subordinate to Muhammad ﷺ, derives from Muhammad ﷺ, does not bring a new Sharīʿah, and is understood as a manifestation or reflection of the Muhammadi prophethood.

The first is precisely the kind of claim that destroys the finality and supremacy of Muhammad ﷺ.

The second is the claim that Ahmadis are actually making.

Therefore, the anti-Ahmadi argument cannot simply collapse both propositions into one category and then quote a ruling against the first as though it automatically disproves the second.

The Broader Sunni Tradition Makes the Issue Even More Difficult

This is why the broader Sunni tradition cannot simply be ignored.

Mulla ʿAli al-Qari himself gives a formulation in which a prophet could hypothetically arise after Muhammad ﷺ while remaining his follower, without contradicting Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

Mujaddid Alf Thani speaks of the attainment of prophetic attributes by followers of Muhammad ﷺ “as subordinate or by way of inheritance” without contradiction to his being Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

Ibn ʿArabi distinguishes the termination of law-bearing prophethood from the broader prophetic station.

ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Shaʿrani likewise gives the formulation that the statements of the Holy Prophet ﷺ concerning there being no prophet or messenger after him mean that there will be no law-bearing prophet after him.

Shah Waliullah al-Dehlawi likewise explains La nabi ba’di in connection with the absence of a prophet who would bring a new law or Sharīʿah.

And Sunni scholars defending the descent of Jesus ﷺ have had to explain that his return does not violate Khatam an-Nabiyyin because he does not return with an abrogating law.

Again, this does not prove Ahmadiyyat by itself.

What it does prove is that the simplistic equation:

“Any use of the word prophet after Muhammad ﷺ = the exact kufr condemned by every Hanafi authority”

is not historically or conceptually sufficient.

The terminology requires explanation.

What About the Strongest Hanafi Statements?

At this point, an opponent may return to the strongest wording:

“But Abu Hafs said it is kufr.”

“Ghaznawi said the claimant must repent.”

“Ibn Nujaym said that denying Muhammad ﷺ as the last prophet makes a person a disbeliever.”

“Al-Qari said it is kufr by consensus.”

“Al-Tahawi said every claim after him is falsehood.”

None of these quotations should simply be ignored.

But neither should they be treated as if they magically answer the disputed question.

For example, Ibn Nujaym’s statement is especially important because it explicitly connects disbelief with failure to recognize Muhammad ﷺ as the last of the prophets. That raises the question: what does “last of the prophets” mean in the broader Hanafi-Sunni interpretive tradition?

If Mulla ʿAli al-Qari can explain Khatam an-Nabiyyin in a manner that excludes a prophet who abrogates Muhammad’s law and is outside his Ummah, then the meaning of “last” and the meaning of “prophet after him” require further examination.

Likewise, if Mujaddid Alf Thani can speak about followers of Muhammad ﷺ attaining the attributes of prophethood “as subordinate or by way of inheritance” without contradicting his being Khatam an-Nabiyyin, then the category of subordinate prophetic manifestation cannot simply be ignored.

And if Ibn ʿArabi can distinguish the termination of law-bearing prophethood from the prophetic station, while a prominent Deobandi Hanafi debater himself admits that “we Hanafis have no answer” to a difficult passage on this issue, then it is clear that the intellectual history is not as straightforward as the anti-Ahmadi argument suggests.

The Wahhabi/Salafi Point: Hanafiyyat aur Mirzaiyyat

There is another interesting point that the anti-Ahmadi argument conveniently overlooks. Even Wahhabi and Salafi anti-Ahmadi literature has recognized that the relationship between Hanafi teachings and Ahmadiyyat is not as straightforward as simply saying, “Hanafis reject Ahmadis.”

A work titled Hanafiyyat aur Mirzaiyyat was written from an anti-Ahmadi Wahhabi/Salafi perspective precisely to examine the similarities and parallels between Hanafi teachings and Ahmadi beliefs. The very existence of such a work is significant. Why would an anti-Ahmadi Wahhabi author need to devote an entire work to comparing Hanafi teachings with Mirzaiyyat if the two were simply and fundamentally opposed on the question of the finality of prophethood?

This becomes especially relevant when Mulla ʿAli al-Qari is repeatedly quoted as though one isolated statement from him settles the entire question. If the Hanafi tradition is being invoked as the decisive authority against Ahmadiyyat, then its broader teachings and internal distinctions also have to be considered.

In other words, the argument cannot simply be:

“Here are five Hanafi quotations against claiming prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ. Therefore, the Ahmadi position is automatically refuted.”

The proper question is:

“Do these quotations actually address and condemn the specific Zillī/Burūzī conception of prophethood claimed by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad?”

If the answer is supposed to be yes, that needs to be demonstrated—not merely assumed.

Indeed, the fact that anti-Ahmadi Wahhabi/Salafi literature itself has devoted attention to comparing Hanafiyyat and Mirzaiyyat should make us cautious about presenting the Hanafi tradition as though it were a monolithic body of thought whose every formulation can be reduced to a single anti-Ahmadi slogan.

Maulana Muhammad Ahsan Amrohi’s Detailed Answer to the Objection

This objection was directly addressed by Maulana Sayyid Muhammad Ahsan of Amroha, one of the foremost scholars of the Ahmadiyya Movement and a scholar who, on the instructions of Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, would respond to the allegations of opponents.

A few days after the publication of Aik Ghalati Ka Izala, Maulana Muhammad Ahsan informed Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that he had received a letter from Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf, who had heard that Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had claimed to be a prophet in the pamphlet—meaning, in the conception of non-Ahmadi Muslims, a Mustaqil (independent/autonomous) or Shari‘i (law-bearing) Nabi appearing after the Holy Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad instructed Maulana Ahsan to answer the allegation in detail so that his beliefs would be clearly conveyed.

The resulting letter, dated 21 November 1901, was published in Al-Hakam on 24 November 1901 and extended over six pages. The editor described it as a detailed exposition of Aik Ghalati Ka Izala. Maulana Ahsan’s response is particularly relevant because he did not merely offer a general defense. He went through Aik Ghalati Ka Izala and listed nineteen separate passages in which Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad explicitly denied the very conception of prophethood that Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf was attributing to him.

Maulana Ahsan begins by stating that the pamphlet itself contains clear and explicit denials of the alleged claim:

“There certainly cannot come any prophet, new or old, in the way in which…”

He then points out that it states:

“Such a belief is undoubtedly a sin, and the verse ‘He is the Messenger of Allah and the Khatam an-nabiyyin’ along with the hadith ‘there is no prophet after me’ are conclusive proof of the absolute falsity of this view.”

Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad further says:

“I, however, am strongly opposed to such beliefs.”

and:

“I … have true and full faith in the statement.”

referring to the doctrine of Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

The pamphlet then explains the distinction upon which the Ahmadi position rests:

“After the Holy Prophet Muhammad, the doors of prophecies have been closed till the Day of Judgment. … But one window, that of the path of Siddiq, is open, namely, fana fir-rasul.”

Maulana Ahsan explains this fana fir-rasul as perfect successorship to the Holy Prophet ﷺ, which is also described as Burūz or manifestation.

The pamphlet further states:

“It is not possible now for a Hindu or a Jew or a Christian or a nominal Muslim to apply the word nabi to himself.”

and:

“All the windows of prophethood have been closed.”

The distinction becomes even more explicit when Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad states:

“After our Holy Prophet Muhammad till the Day of Judgment, there is no prophet to whom a new Shariah is to be revealed.”

and:

“And whoever makes such a claim indeed commits heresy.”

He then applies this distinction directly to himself:

“I have not brought a Shariah independently.”

“Nor am I a prophet in my own right.”

“I am not a possessor of Shariah.”

He further explains:

“All these graces have not been bestowed upon me without mediation, but that there is a holy being in heaven, namely, Muhammad Mustafa, whose spiritual benefit I have received.”

Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad then returns to the doctrine of Khatam an-Nabiyyin:

“In other words, the term Khatam an-Nabiyyin is a Divine seal which has been put upon the prophethood of the Holy Prophet. It is not possible now that this seal could ever break.”

And:

“A seal has been put upon prophethood till the Day of Judgment.”

Finally, he directly addresses the allegation:

“Ignorant opponents accuse me of claiming to be a prophet and messenger. I make no such claim.”

He clarifies:

“I am neither a prophet nor a messenger in the sense which they have in mind.”

and concludes:

“Hence the person who maliciously accuses me of claiming prophethood and messengership is a liar and evil-minded.”

Maulana Ahsan therefore asks, in substance, how a person whose writing repeatedly denies autonomous prophethood (Nabuwaat-Mustaqil) can reasonably be accused of claiming autonomous prophethood ( (Nabuwaat-Mustaqil). He asks the critic whether, “if you have any fear of God in you,” he can really describe someone whose writing repeatedly denies such a claim as a claimant to that very thing.

He then asks:

“Or, can any sane adult say that this fana fir-rasul has claimed that prophethood and messengership which is denied by the consensus of opinion of the entire Muslim Umma?”

This is the central issue. Maulana Ahsan is not denying the finality of prophethood. He is arguing that the finality of prophethood must not be confused with the spiritual graces that flow from the Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

The Distinction Between Khatam an-Nabiyyin and Its Spiritual Graces

Maulana Ahsan then introduces what he calls certain principles accepted by the major authorities of the Muslim Ummah. Among these is the principle that members of the Muslim Ummah can receive Divine communications and knowledge of the unseen.

He then explains his understanding of the terminology of nabi and rasul, and connects this with the fact that Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf had already accepted Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Mujaddid and had accepted his revelations.

From this he argues that the issue is not whether Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was claiming the independent prophethood of a new law-bearing prophet. Rather, the issue is whether a person who is completely subordinate to Muhammad ﷺ can be described as a nabi or rasul by way of reflection (zill).

Maulana Ahsan writes:

“The first point is the confirmation and establishment of the doctrine of Khatam an-nabiyyin, which has the highest precedence. The second point, which is a branch of the first one, is the proof and establishment of the benefits and blessings of the Khatam an-nabiyyin, which in other words is known as prophethood by way of reflection, partial messengership or the burooz of Muhammad.”

He then emphasizes that these two ideas are connected:

“Though these two concepts are mutually dependent, but unless the first one is established and proved, the second one cannot be proved.”

This is important for understanding his argument. The Burūz of Muhammad ﷺ is not presented as a rival to Khatam an-Nabiyyin. It is presented as a consequence and manifestation of it.

Bayazid Bustami and the Language of Burūz

Maulana Ahsan then turns to examples from the spiritual tradition of Islam. This is one of the most striking portions of his letter because he does not merely assert that the concept of Burūz exists—he gives examples of earlier Muslim saints using remarkably strong prophetic language.

He writes:

“There is a hadith: ‘The ulama of my Umma are like the prophets of the Israelites.’”

He then cites another report:

“Whomever death overtakes while he is searching for knowledge with which to revive Islam, there is only one degree between him and the prophets in heaven.”

Maulana Ahsan then asks:

“Now I ask you: do you think that the Mahdi and the Promised Messiah is no greater at all than that seeker of knowledge who seeks knowledge in order to revive Islam?”

He then gives an even more striking example:

“Hazrat Ali has also been called the burooz of the Messiah by the Holy Prophet.”

But the most interesting example is his reference to Bayazid Bustami:

“It is written in Tazkirat-ul-Auliya that Hazrat Bayazid Bustami said: I am Adam, I am Seth, I am Noah, I am Abraham, I am Moses, I am Jesus, I am Muhammad.”

Maulana Ahsan immediately explains why he considers this relevant:

“It is worth remembering here that Bayazid Bustami has made this claim to be burooz by himself. There is no specific prophecy about him made by the Holy Prophet.”

His argument is therefore that Muslim mystical literature already contained examples of saints describing themselves in the language of manifestation or identification with earlier prophets. The significance, according to Ahsan, is not that Bayazid Bustami literally became an independent Adam, Noah, Moses, Jesus, or Muhammad. Rather, he was speaking in the language of Burūz and spiritual identification.

Ahsan then contrasts this with the Promised Messiah:

“But the Holy Prophet has himself given the Promised Mahdi the names Muhammad and Ahmad in his sayings.”

He continues:

“Even more interesting is that in Barahin Ahmadiyya both these names are to be found in revelations. Thus the hadith confirms the revelation, and the revelation confirms the hadith.”

And he adds:

“The name Ahmad was given to him even at birth as a mark of respect and honour for the Holy Prophet Muhammad, that is: Ghulam Ahmad.”

Maulana Ahsan’s point is that the name Muhammad or Ahmad applied to the Promised Messiah is not being understood merely as an ordinary personal name. He argues that it points to the spiritual reality of Burūz:

“It is obvious that by the giving of the name [in hadith] is not meant the name merely as a word, for hundreds of children are given the names Ahmad and Muhammad. Here by names Muhammad and Ahmad is meant the true nature underlying these names.”

Ibn Arabi and the Concept of Spiritual Union

Maulana Ahsan then gives another example from Ibn Arabi. He writes:

“Muhyuddin Ibn Arabi writes in Futuhat that he saw the Holy Prophet Muhammad in a dream, in which Imam Abu Muhammad Ibn Hazm embraced the Holy Prophet and disappeared into him, so that there was none there except the Holy Prophet Muhammad.”

He identifies this as an example of what he calls ittihad or union, explaining that the person appearing as Burūz can be a Mujaddid who is completely self-effaced in the Holy Prophet ﷺ.

This is important because it demonstrates the conceptual framework Ahsan Amrohi is using. His argument is not simply that the word nabi can be redefined whenever convenient. Rather, he is appealing to a broader Islamic mystical vocabulary in which saints and spiritual figures could be described through their complete identification with, manifestation of, or self-effacement in earlier prophets.

He therefore argues that the Promised Messiah’s claim should be understood within this framework rather than through the definition of a Mustaqil or Shari‘i prophet who establishes an independent religious law.

Why Did the Early Muslims Not Use This Terminology?

Maulana Ahsan then addresses the obvious question: if this type of zillī or Burūzī prophethood was possible, why did the Companions and early generations not openly call themselves nabi or rasul?

His answer is that there were two distinct stages.

The first was the establishment of the doctrine of Khatam an-Nabiyyin. Because false claimants such as Musaylimah had appeared, the early Muslims’ attention was directed toward firmly establishing the finality of Muhammad ﷺ and eliminating the false claims of independent prophets.

Once this doctrine had become firmly established throughout the Muslim Ummah, Maulana Ahsan argues, the time came for the blessings and spiritual graces of that finality to be manifested.

He writes:

“When belief in the finality of prophethood had become well fixed in the minds of the entire Umma, then came the time for the proof and demonstration of those graces and blessings of the finality of prophethood.”

He therefore sees the appearance of the Promised Messiah not as a challenge to Khatam an-Nabiyyin, but as a demonstration of its spiritual consequences.

He connects this to the names Muhammad and Ahmad given to the Promised Mahdi, arguing that these names point toward the Burūz of Muhammad ﷺ.

The Continuing Blessings of Khatam an-Nabiyyin

Maulana Ahsan then asks a broader theological question:

“If the blessings of the finality of prophethood cannot be attained, by way of reflection, by its worthy, perfect and sincere followers, then how can the reform of the Umma and the revival of the religion of Islam take place?”

He continues:

“Which accomplishment of the Khatam an-nabiyyin, the head of the messengers, will remain in the world, if all those doors of graces and Divine blessings which were open for the Israelites are closed and all blessings from the Holy Prophet Muhammad have come to an end?”

He then interprets Qur’an 33:40 in this context, arguing that the Holy Prophet’s status as Khatam an-Nabiyyin does not mean that his spiritual influence and blessings cease after his physical life. Rather, those blessings continue to reach the perfect members of his Ummah.

He writes:

“The graces of his messengership and the blessings of his finality of prophethood will continue till the Day of Judgment.”

And he identifies these blessings with:

“Juzwi prophethood and messengership by way of reflection.”

*Note: Ahsan Amrohi RA referred to Juzwi nabis as actual prophets See: Lahori Ahmadi Elders Affirming Prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad AS

He then connects this specifically to the Promised Messiah:

“And in the last days a Mahdi will arise who will be ‘Muhammad’ and ‘Ahmad’.”

The Significance of These Examples

Maulana Ahsan’s examples are important because they show exactly how he understood the terminology being used.

He cites the ulama being compared to the prophets of Israel.

He cites a seeker of knowledge being only one degree removed from the prophets in heaven.

He cites Hadhrat Ali being described as the Burūz of the Messiah.

He cites Bayazid Bustami saying:

“I am Adam, I am Seth, I am Noah, I am Abraham, I am Moses, I am Jesus, I am Muhammad.”

And he cites Ibn Arabi describing Ibn Hazm as disappearing into the Holy Prophet Muhammad ﷺ.

None of these examples are presented as claims to independent, law-bearing prophethood. Rather, they illustrate the language of spiritual manifestation, identification, and fana fi’r-Rasul that Maulana Ahsan believes provides the proper framework for understanding the Promised Messiah.

That is why his response to the Hanafi objection is significant.

The Hanafi quotations may condemn someone who says, in the ordinary sense, “I am an independent prophet after Muhammad ﷺ.” But that is precisely the conception Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad repeatedly rejected.

The Ahmadi claim, as explained by Maulana Ahsan, is instead that the Promised Messiah is a Burūz of Muhammad ﷺ, a perfect reflection of the Khatam an-Nabiyyin whose spiritual status exists only through complete subordination to him.

Therefore, the anti-Ahmadi argument still has to establish the crucial point: that the Hanafi authorities intended their condemnations to include this specific Burūzī and Zillī conception, rather than the independent or Shari‘i prophethood that Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad explicitly rejected.

Simply quoting a Hanafi scholar saying that “whoever claims prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ is a disbeliever” does not, by itself, answer that question. The entire dispute is over what kind of prophethood is being claimed and what kind of prophethood those Hanafi statements were condemning.

Importantly, this detailed explanation by Maulana Sayyid Muhammad Ahsan of Amroha was not merely his own private interpretation. Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself instructed him to write a “very detailed and clear letter” so that his beliefs could be properly conveyed to the opponent. The resulting six-page letter was then published in Al-Hakam as a detailed exposition of Aik Ghalati Ka Izala. The editorial introduction described it as an “invaluable letter” and a “fine exposition” of the pamphlet, stating that it contained “truth and knowledge” and that the scholar was speaking “with the support of the Holy Spirit.” Thus, the explanation given by Maulana Ahsan was published with the approval and direction of Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and presented as an authoritative explanation of the position expressed in Aik Ghalati Ka Izala.

The Anti-Ahmadi Argument Still Has to Prove the Crucial Point

The burden of proof therefore lies with the anti-Ahmadi argument.

If you quote Mulla ʿAli al-Qari, explain his complete position.

If you quote al-Tahawi, explain precisely what category of prophetic claim he was condemning.

If you quote Ibn Nujaym, explain whether his statement is directed against someone denying that Muhammad ﷺ is Khatam an-Nabiyyin in the sense understood by the Sunni creed, or whether it explicitly addresses the technical distinction Ahmadis make.

If you quote Abu Hafs al-Kabir, explain the context and the type of prophetic claim being discussed.

And if you invoke “ijmaʿ,” demonstrate that the alleged consensus actually encompasses the specific technical conception of Zillī/Burūzī prophethood rather than simply assuming that it does.

Otherwise, the argument becomes circular.

The reasoning becomes:

The Hanafi scholars said a claimant to prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ is a disbeliever.”

Then:

“Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed prophethood.”

Therefore:

“Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a disbeliever.”

But the entire disputed issue lies between those two premises:

What did “claiming prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ” mean in the Hanafi statements, and does that definition encompass Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s particular claim?

That is precisely what must be proved.

Conclusion

The real question is not whether Muhammad ﷺ is Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

Ahmadis affirm this.

It is not whether an independent prophet carrying a new Sharīʿah can come after him.

Ahmadis reject this.

It is not whether someone can appear after Muhammad ﷺ possessing an independent prophetic office that competes with or supersedes him.

Ahmadis reject this as well.

And it is not even whether Jesus ﷺ can return with a new Sharīʿah after Muhammad ﷺ.

Ahmadis reject that conception too.

The actual point of disagreement is whether a completely subordinate, non-law-bearing, Zillī/Burūzī manifestation of the prophethood of Muhammad ﷺ can be described as nubuwwah without violating Khatam an-Nabiyyin.

And ironically, the Sunni explanation of the return of Jesus ﷺ already requires a distinction between prophethood itself and independent, law-bearing prophethood after Muhammad ﷺ.

If Jesus ﷺ can remain a prophet while appearing after Muhammad ﷺ because he does not bring a new law and remains subordinate to the Sharīʿah of Muhammad ﷺ, then the anti-Ahmadi cannot simply end the discussion by saying:

“There is no prophet after Muhammad ﷺ.”

They have to explain what “prophet” means in the particular case being discussed.

That is precisely the distinction Ahmadis are asking them to address.

The Hanafi quotations therefore do not settle the debate merely by being quoted. They establish that a particular conception of post-Muhammadan prophethood was condemned. The real question is whether that condemned category is identical to the conception Mirza Ghulam Ahmad actually claimed.

And that is the question the anti-Ahmadi argument still has to answer.